A cap on bankers’ bonuses will do little to reduce risk-taking in the banking industry. by Matthews, Kent & Matthews, Owen
blo gs.lse.ac.uk
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/03/06/a-cap-on-bankers-bonuses-will-do-little-to-reduce-risk-taking-in-the-banking-
industry/
Canary Wharf, Lo nd o n (Pub lic  Do main)
A cap on bankers’ bonuses will do little to reduce risk-taking
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by Blog Admin
A provisional EU agreement has been reached on the principle of capping bonuses in the
European banking industry. Kent Matthews and Owen Matthews present a case for
maintaining bankers’ bonuses, arguing that there is no causal link between bonuses and
excessive risk-taking. They state that the real cause of risk-taking is the widespread policy of
bailing out banks which are deemed ‘too big to fail’, and that capping bankers’ bonuses might
simply drive business away from Europe towards other global financial centres.
The European Parliament is misguided in thinking that a cap on bankers’ bonuses  will reduce
risk-taking and tilt  the banking industry back to the boring banking world of  Captain
Mainwaring. The argument is based on the simplistic notion that there is a posit ive
relationship between bankers’ bonuses and risk-taking: theref ore controls on bonuses will
also control risk taking. The problem with this argument is that bankers’ bonuses are an
effect and not a cause of  excessive risk taking by banks. In other words, both compensation
and risk taking are endogenous variables, driven by the widespread expectation that banks
are ‘too-big-to-f ail’ and will always be bailed out by the taxpayer.
In bailing out the banks, governments cemented the view that because of  their size, inf luence, and nature,
banks were too big to f ail. To allow them do so would lead to a systemic risk which would quickly inf ect the
entire banking system. There is perhaps some truth to this, but the unintended consequence of  deeming
banks to be too big to f ail is that it actively encourages excessively risky behaviour. What incentive is there
f or a banker to exercise restraint when he knows that if  the worst comes to the worst the taxpayer will step
in?
What then is the solution? A ‘no bailout policy’, which would be the ‘f irst best’ case is ‘t ime inconsistent’. It
lacks credibility because of  the f undamental importance attached to the protection of  depositors and the
payment mechanism f rom systemic f ailure. Counter-cyclical capital requirements, deeper capital adequacy,
higher liquidity ratios, ring f encing, lower leverage ratios and even downsizing are all regulatory measures
that have been proposed in the Basel 3 measures and the Vickers Report. Caps on bankers’ pay are not
part of  this.
While the European proposal is superf icially
appealing to a banker-bashing electorate, the
decision has been largely derided by
commentators and industry experts, with
London’s typically outspoken mayor
describing the deal as “possibly the most
deluded measure to come f rom Europe since
Diocletian tried to f ix the price of  groceries
across the Roman Empire.” Controls on pay
f or bankers will do nothing to address the
risks its proponents are concerned about,
and could end up damaging the most
prof itable square mile in the world. The
economics of  tax evasion and avoidance
(sometimes ref erred to as ‘avoision’) provide
clues as to the response of  the industry.
Discussions have already begun on the ways in which banks may seek to circumvent such rules, with the
most popular suggestion being that they will increase salaries in order to retain the top talent. Doing so
would not only diminish the link between pay and perf ormance, it will substantially increase banks’ f ixed cost
base, reducing their competit ive posit ion and leaving them with less f lexibility to reduce or claw-back
bonuses when needed.
Raising salaries is also unlikely to be the banks’ only option. From generous housing allowances to devising
loyalty payments, banks in London have a history of  f inding ways around payroll legislation they don’t like
(in the 1990s some paid part of  their employees’ salaries in gold bullion, diamonds and f ine wines in a bid to
avoid a f orm of  payroll tax).
The UK, whose government is opposed to the current proposals, already has some of  the most stringent
compensation regulation in the developed world. The Remuneration Code, introduced in January 2010 and
revised in 2011, applies to some 2,700 f inancial sector f irms (and also applies to overseas branches of  UK
headquartered banks covered by the Code). Its provisions include requirements that at least 40 per cent of
variable remuneration should be def erred f or at least 3 to 5 years, that 50 per cent of  variable
remuneration is paid in shares or some other non-cash f orm, and that bonuses should include
perf ormance adjustment mechanisms to allow unvested awards to be reduced where there is evidence of
employee misbehaviour or material error, or there is a material downturn in the f inancial perf ormance of  the
f irm. Anything more restrictive will play into the hands of  competing f inancial centres such as New York,
Hong Kong and Singapore.
Figures published on bonus compensation (Figures 1 and 2) already show a clear divergence between the
City of  London and Wall Street since the onset of  the f inancial crisis. While neither have returned to pre-
crisis levels, London’s bonus pool has continued to shrink, whereas Wall Street variable compensation
appears to have stabilised. A recent survey of  UK banking prof essionals conducted by Hays recruitment
showed 69 per cent of  respondents were dissatisf ied with their bonuses, and 34 per cent of  them were
looking to leave their employers because of  their bonuses f alling below expectations. Such evidence lends
f urther support to the argument that over the longer term London’s coveted posit ion as a global f inancial
epicentre will continue to be eroded as bankers vote with their f eet and move to jurisdictions with f ewer
restrictions on pay.
Figure 1: New York (Wall Street) Bonuses ($ billion)
Source: New York State Comptroller
Figure 2: London Bonuses (£ billion)
Source: Centre of Economics and Business Research
Figure 1 shows a stabilising of  total bonus payments in New York, but the level is still well below the peak
of  2006-7. The hard line is the two-year moving average which indicates the trend development. Figure 2
shows the total bonuses f or London, illustrating a clear downward trend. This downward trend in London is
a result of  restructuring in response to anticipated regulation. The scaling back of  bonuses is consistent
with the research of  Phillipon and Reshef . They f ind that f inancial deregulation and corporate activit ies
linked to IPOs (init ial public of f erings) and credit risk increase the demand f or skills in f inancial jobs, which
in turn drives the earnings and bonuses of  f inancial sector workers.
The impending regulatory environment has af f ected banking behaviour and bank lending (whether this is a
desirable outcome in the current economic climate is another matter). Banks that were a f ew years ago
posting returns on average equity targets of  25 per cent, are now targeting more modest returns of  10-15
per cent. However, the banks will still need f inancial market specialists to generate returns in individual
prof it centres, even if  overall prof its are down or even negative, and these specialists operate in a
competit ive labour market.
Bankers have been singled out as the principal villains in the blame game of  the great recession, but in
reality they were only a link in a long chain of  villains starting with Western central banks and regulatory
agencies, and ending up with highly leveraged households and f irms. The link between pay and risk taking in
banking is an established empirical f act, but the bottom line is that pay does not cause risk taking.
Regulation can mitigate some of  the risk taking generated by the creation of  ‘too big to f ail’ policies. Caps
on bankers’ pay will at a minimum create market distortions, deadweight losses through avoision schemes
and be welf are inf erior. In the worst case, it will drive business away f rom Europe and do nothing to protect
us f rom the next banking crisis.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/15xdGEp
 _________________________________
About the authors
Kent Matthews – Cardiff University
Kent Matthews is a graduate of  the LSE and the Sir Julian Hodge Prof essor of  Banking at
Cardif f  Business School, Cardif f  University. His research is in the area of  bank
deregulation, banking perf ormance and competit ion in emerging economies.
-
Owen Matthews – Deloitte LLP
Owen Matthews is a graduate of  LSE and is a f ormer City Solicitor now working in
restructuring services at Deloitte LLP.
Related posts:
1. Brussels blog round-up f or 23 February – 1 March: Beppe Grillo shocks Berlin and
Brussels, Putin’s Eurasian Union ambitions, and should bankers’ bonuses be capped?
(10.1)
2. A cap on bankers’ bonuses is needed to limit excessive risk taking and the associated costs to the
taxpayer. (28.7)
3. The European Central Bank has delegated its lender of  last resort duty to panicky bankers who are
the slaves of  market sentiments. Pumping in over 1,000 billion Euros this way has not stabilized
Europe’s sovereign debt markets. (9.9)
